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Abstract:  
All other terms being equal (e.g. seniority), syndicated loan contracts provide larger lending 
compensations (in percentage points) to institutions funding larger amounts. This paper 
explores empirically the motivation for such a price design on a sample of sovereign 
syndicated loans in the period 1990-1997. I find strong evidence that a larger premium is 
associated with higher renegotiation probability and information asymmetries. It hardly has 
any impact on the number of lenders though. This is consistent with the hypothesis that larger 
lenders act as main lenders, namely help reduce information asymmetries and provide 
services in situations of liquidity shortage. This constitutes new evidence of the existence of 
compensations for such unique services. Moreover, larger payment discrepancies are also 
associated with larger syndicated loan amounts. This provides further new evidence that 
larger borrowers bear additional borrowing costs. 
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1  Introduction 
Loan syndication and the structure of debts have raised growing attention in the recent 
literature. This study is intended to analyze the economic motivations for borrowers to favor larger 
lending by offering larger premiums to larger providers within a single syndicated facility, all 
participants being subject to same rights and duties on paper. Previous authors have predicted three 
main likely services provided in return by the larger lenders. First, the debtor is likely to benefit 
from a reduced number of lending relationships. Second, large or main creditors may play an 
important function in distress circumstances, especially by providing refinancing insurance. Last, 
provided the limited financing ability of existing banks, successful large loan syndication may 
depend on the individual contributions. Thus, larger borrowers bear bigger borrowing costs by 
giving incentives to creditors to provide extra lending. The results are consistent with the main 
bank and borrowing costs hypotheses. The fee discrepancy has little effect on the number of 
lenders. 
The syndicated loan is a single facility financed by a group of b anks under the same 
conditions. In this type of contract, lenders’ returns increase in basis points as a function of the 
committed amount, all other terms being equal (e.g. seniority). The premium is reflected in the 
front-end fee (the so-called up-front fee is charged at the signature date of the contract, before any 
amount is yet paid out). I suggest the empirical study of such a price differential that explores the 
motivation, from the borrower’s perspective, to favor larger lenders to emerge. Indeed, the 
borrower, strongly advised by his arrangers, predefines the function that relates the individual 
funded amount and the premium before the syndication is launched. The study is based on a sample 
of 100 loans issued or guaranteed by sovereign agents in the period, January 1990 to December 
1997. I conduct the analysis on sovereign capital markets because the latter suffer from particularly 
poor legal frameworks, allowing for a better disentanglement between the respective risks of 
renegotiation and of repudiation (pure default).   2
The first hypothesis is therefore that the borrower compensates larger lenders to reduce the 
number of lenders and associated costs. Apparently, the device is useful to the sovereign state that 
is short in liquidity, but still, is unwilling to default strategically and would like to maintain future 
access to capital markets. This is consistent with the hypothesis that renegotiation costs are increase 
in function of the lack of coordination among lenders (Bolton and Sharfstein (1996), Preece and 
Mullineaux (1996), Brunner and Krahnen (2001)). Besides, borrowers who present substantial 
information asymmetries and numerous lending relationships face higher probabilities of 
coordination failure among lenders (Morris and Shin (2002)). Hence, favoring the concentration of 
liabilities would reduce the number of participants, at some minimal cost, and constitute a sound 
approach to avoid inefficient pre-emptive actions. I find little evidence of price differential having a 
significant and negative impact on the number of financial institutions joining the syndicate. 
Independently of the number of lenders, the borrower is likely to compensate his main banks 
for services related to periods of liquidity shortage. In contrast to previous studies that proxied 
relationship lending with the duration of lending, Elsas (2002) finds that the key element that 
makes a bank view itself as a relationship lender is the size of its share in the borrower’s external 
financing. Moreover, it has been highlighted that one of the main functions of the main bank is to 
act as a liquidity insurer in situations of unexpected deterioration (Elsas and Krahnen (1998)). 
Although previous authors find evidence that the main banks fulfill this role, they hardly find 
compensations reflected in credits costs. I do find that expected renegotiation and information 
asymmetries have a significant impact on the lending premium. 
Last, the number of lending relationships is determined by the size of the borrower (Petersen 
and Rajan (1994), Ongena and Smith (2000), and Machauer and Weber (2000)). Authors did not 
find any impact of the borrower size on the price of debts though. I find that discrepancies among 
fees income are substantially affected by the  absolute  size of the loan. This constitutes new 
evidence that a larger loan size (hence larger borrower) yields larger costs.   3
The analysis of the distribution of lending compensations in function of individual 
commitments within the same credit facility permits to draw answers to questions concerning the 
number of lending relationships and the structure of lenders. The findings are also related to the 
literature that addresses the services provided by main banks. The study also relates to the literature 
aimed at understanding how syndicated loans operate. To a lesser extent though, the study 
contributes to the literature on sovereign debts. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section I describe in further detail the theory 
behind the empirical investigation. Section 3 contains the description of the empirical models. In 
section 4 the sampling procedure, the actuarial calculations, and the data set are described. The 
results and their interpretation are reported in section 5. Section 6 presents the sensitivity analysis. 
The last section provides concluding remarks. 
2  Theoretical background 
2.1 The optimal number of lenders and relationship lending 
The impact of the number of lenders on borrowing costs has been well investigated. It is mainly 
proportional to information collection and renegotiation costs. Under the asymmetric information 
approach, Sharpe (1990), Diamond (1991) and Rajan (1992) show that a close and repeated lending 
relationship, reflected by the reduced number of lenders, decreases amounts of information 
asymmetries and associated costs. This affects the smaller and less public borrower. On the other 
hand, the smaller number of lenders also increases every lender’s own voting rights in the event of 
a financial distress. The “information monopoly” also may result in a “lending hold-up” from 
inside lenders being in monopolistic position. Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) demonstrate that there 
is an optimal debt structure that balances these effects. The higher number of lenders will deter the 
manager to default strategically that is to divert cash. However, facing a liquidity shortage beyond 
the manager’s control, the inevitable distress will incur higher renegotiation cost due to the lack of   4
coordination among lenders. A recent line of research (Brunner and Krahnen (2001), Morris and 
Shin (2002)) highlighted the costs related to the coordination failure among lenders, also known as 
the “common pool” problem. The common pool problem is created as at least one creditor 
withdraws from the pool of lenders and request early repayment even if the project is feasible. This 
unnecessary financial distress is caused by high information asymmetries. Therefore, in this case, 
cutting the number of banks reduces the probability that such an event occurs. 
Empirical studies document evidence suggesting that the issue of bank private loans had a 
positive impact on the value of the firm in contrast with publicly tradable debts (James (1987)), 
more specifically the private loan renewal (Lummer and McConnel (1989)). Further analyses 
validated that the borrower has a larger set of lenders as the amount of asymmetric information 
declines (Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Dennis and Mullineaux (2000)) while coordination has a 
positive impact on the value of the lending institution’s stocks (Brunner and Krahnen (2001)). The 
value of the syndicated loan is also found to be a negative function of the number of syndicated 
lenders that are believed to increase the renegotiation costs (Preece and Mullineaux (1996)) and of 
the credit rating of the lending institutions (Billett et al. (1995)). This provides evidence of the 
renegotiation costs affecting the value of the asset. Main banks also fulfill the role of liquidity 
insurer and renegotiation coordinator (Elsas and Krahnen (1998)). Note that it is not by chance that 
renegotiation costs are compensated up-front. Interestingly, the bank loan non-linear structure of 
pricing is set up specifically in order to balance bargaining power in future renegotiation (Gorton an 
Khan (2000), Hallak (2001)). 
Last, the weak creditor rights and poor legal enforcement are associated with more lending 
relationships (Ongena and Smith (2000)) and more scattered ownership structure on project finance 
(Esty and Megginson (2003)). Hence, international syndication in a limited legal structure is aimed 
at deterring strategic default rather than to enhance the monitoring or facilitate the renegotiation.   5
2.2. Lending amounts 
An alternative explanation for the price discrimination on syndicated loans follows the line of 
research on the borrower’s size and its impact on borrowing costs. Presumably, the larger borrower 
would increase the price differential and add several ranks to reach several lending markets, thus 
attempting to expand the number of lending relationships. The motivation is the size of the loan 
which in turn is likely to be related to the size of the firm (Petersen and Rajan (1994), Ongena and 
Smith (2000), Machauer and Weber (2000)). The larger country that issues larger debt amounts 
may request funds beyond financing capacities of existing banks. Although previous research found 
little evidence of the number of banking relationship affecting the interest margin, additional cost 
might be reflected in the front-end payments. The interest premium will however follow the 
creditworthiness compensation accordingly to the borrowed volumes. The positive impact of the 
loan amount and the number of ranks on the price discrepancy would be consistent with the 
hypothesis. 
Note however that by compensating lenders according to their individual commitments, the 
borrower may be attempting to quantity-based price discriminate in order to reduce borrowing 
costs. The borrower therefore taps various lending market segments, thus attempting to minimize 
borrowing costs and/or increase borrowing capacities. Although the literature provides a wide range 
of illustrations, quantity based price discrimination is hardly documented on financial products. 
However, the non-linear pattern of syndication pricing will let the borrower decrease his borrowing 
costs the same way the monopolist increases his profits. The intuition is as follows. The monopolist 
borrower offers a relatively low lending amount to the low-demand lender. The borrower thus 
captures the low-supply lender surplus and reduces the high-demand costs. The borrower hence 
enlarges the spectrum of lending patterns and by doing so the number of lenders. The reasoning 
follows Mirrlees (1971).   6
2.3. What is different about sovereigns? 
The sovereign agent is the state or any national entity which acts on behalf of the state (usually 
government entities and the central bank). There are two essential differences between corporate 
and sovereign debt markets. These are the two reasons why I conduct the investigation in these 
markets. 
First, state representative individuals and property goods usually are immune in their own 
jurisdiction and hardly subject to foreign legislations. The sovereign defaulter is however subject to 
sanctions from the business community. In fact, international financial institutions usually  deny 
future access to foreign-currency debts to the defaulter, thus preventing the latter from consumption 
smoothing (Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Cole et. al (1995), Grossman and Han (1999)). Moreover, 
Rose (2002) shows empirically that the default on foreign debts is likely to result in a reduction of 
foreign trade, e.g. because of the rejection of letters of credit from financial institutions. Creditors 
may also have the right to seize debtor’s cash and assets available abroad (Bulow and Rogoff 
(1989), Hallak (2003)). The amount of collateral is however rather small and uneasy to seize in a 
swift manner. Although this may have an impact on bond debt markets (Hallak (2003)), it is 
unlikely to be the case in bank credit markets where coordination among lenders is binding.
1 In 
fact, the repayment of foreign bank debts is chiefly reputation motivated to allow further credits.
2 
This first remark implies an important economic consequence. Namely, according to his 
expected cash-flow, the distressed debtor can freely assess whether to repay or renegotiate the 
terms of debts. The respective probabilities that the sovereign may either default or renegotiate 
debts are more easily proxied and disentangled. 
The second interesting difference between the sovereign and the corporate debt markets 
concerns the absence of bankruptcy code and the more acute costs associated with the lack of 
coordination among lenders (Eichengreen and Portes (1995), White (2002)). Hence, the fewer the 
                                                 
1 The coercive cross-default clause is a usual clause in international syndicated loans. It states that the default on any 
one loan implies the default on all other indebtedness of the same borrower or of related entities. 
2 See Eaton and Fernandez (1995) for a review of the sovereign debt literature.   7
participants in the renegotiation are, the better is the distressed sovereign. Secondly, limiting the 
number of creditors will also reduce costs due to information asymmetries. In short, the sovereign 
debtors will pay further attention at the number of lenders and relationship lending. 
There are however similarities between a corporate and a sovereign debtor. Like firms, the 
sovereign seeks to prevent any information hold-up, possibly extracted by an oligopoly of lenders. 
A larger set of lenders also gives access to larger amounts. Moreover, in the absence of a 
bankruptcy code, more than a firm, the sovereign will pay attention to the “common pool problem” 
(Morris and Shin (2002)). 
Assuming the credit interest margin reflects the creditworthiness, the larger premium reflected 
in front-end payments implies larger borrowing costs. The fees discrepancy yields higher 
committing amounts, thus reducing the number of financial institutions participating to the 
syndicate. Therefore, a suitable motivation for the pricing design is that the payment is aimed to 
cover other costs associated with the number of creditors. In particular, the larger are the foreign 
currency liquidities that are available to the state, the more likely the latter will attempt to widen the 
set of lenders to reduce the hold-up problem and also to have access to larger amounts in the future. 
Instead, limited cash availability makes the borrower willing to reduce the number of banks to 
prepare likely renegotiation. In this purpose, the premium is  larger to obtain funds with fewer 
participants. Doing so, the borrower implicitly creates a set of large lenders who presumably help 
refinance while in distress. 
In short, the sovereign and the corporate debtors suffer and benefit from the same advantages 
and disadvantages from a reduced or a large set of lenders, maintaining a main bank or encouraging 
one to emerge, and borrowing costs associated with large amounts. The sovereign debts is 
interesting first because it allows a better disentangling of renegotiation and default expected costs, 
second because lenders coordination issues are more acute. These features bear substantial 
consequences for the conduct of the study.   8
3  Model specifications 
3.1. The economic motivation for compensating larger lenders 
The first model is intended to measure the impact of the determinants of financial distress and 
volatility on the lending premium. The model specification for the price differential calculated as 
the difference between top and bottom end fees is of the form: 
Up-front fees differentiali,j,k  =  Constant + Y0 Dummiesi.k 
  + y1 Loan amounti 
  + y2 Liquidityj,k 
  + y3 Solvencyj,k  (1) 
  + y4 Public informationj,k 
  + y5 Variability of incomej,k 
  + y6 Country Dummyj,k 
  + Errori,j,k 
where a subscript i indicates that the variable refers to the ith loan observation. Coefficients are 
real terms. Similarly subscripts j and k respectively indicate a variable regarding the jth country and 
kth year. Upper-case coefficients indicate vectors. 
The country dummies correct for specific effects of highly represented countries in the data set, 
namely Turkey and India. The loan amount is reported in constant billions of 1995 US dollars. The 
up-front fees differential is calculated as the difference between the highest and the lowest front-
end payments in percentage points. This provides with the larger lender premium. I remind that the 
borrower and the arrangers design the various bids constituted of fee-volume contracts before the 
syndication is launched. 
The first variable is the amount of the loan. I expect the borrower to offer incentives to creditors 
to provide larger amounts in order to raise the requested funds. As the targeted amount increases, 
the price discrepancy is likely to widen. If the larger borrower bears larger borrowing costs, I 
expect y1 to be significantly positive.   9
The proxy for liquidity equals the ratio of the amount of foreign currency reserves available to 
the sovereign by the public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) short-term debt. This liquidity indicator 
is now frequently used (e.g. Eichengreen and Mody (2000)). The ratios of reserves to imports and 
short-term debt to exports are two alternative proxies. However, results showed they added no 
information in the model estimates. The liquidity variable indicates the probability of a temporary 
foreign-currency shortage. In the sovereign debt perspective, this is assumed to indicate that default 
and the subsequent credit disruption is not necessarily maximizing the country's aggregated utility. 
Instead, the sovereign will seek to renegotiate the loan arrangements. The liquidity variable, hence, 
indicates the perspective of renegotiation rather than debt repudiation. When the borrower faces 
high probability of liquidity shortage, she will seek to reduce the number of lending relationships so 
that renegotiation becomes less costly. Alternatively, she will compensate the large lender for a 
possible future role during renegotiation. This is consistent with the literature on relationship 
lending and the design of bank loans (e.g. Elsas and Krahnen (1998), Gorton and Khan (2000), 
Hallak (2001)). Thus, should the differential be related to expected renegotiation, the sign of y2 is 
expected to be positive, thus increasing the payment discrepancy between the lowest and the 
highest committing bank. Should be the borrower be attempting to reduce the number of lenders, 
the impact on the number of lenders should be negative too. This is described in Model (2). 
The proxy for solvency is the ratio of the total amount of PPG long-term debt (lifetime more 
than a year) relative to GNP. Solvency in the sovereign debt literature indicates that the liabilities 
are of a larger amount than the expected cash flows. In this case, credit disruption is unlikely to be a 
credible threat to the sovereign debtor. Unlike the liquidity constraint, solvency is expected to 
hardly affect the fees differential since the default risk is already reflected by the interest rate 
premium itself. Should it be reflected in the front-end fee differential, the interpretation of the se 
fees should be completely different. It would reflect instead the risk aversion of lenders asking for 
larger compensations as their commitments augment. However, there is no reason then why the   10 
price differential should not be reflected in the interest mark-up instead. Overall, y3 is expected to 
be insignificant. 
Measuring the amount and quality of the public information on less-developed countries is a 
sensitive issue, mainly among less-developed countries. Transparency indices usually reflect the 
state of corruption in the country. Moreover, the judging of the quality of the nation’s accounts is 
very subjective. Therefore, I measure the Public information available to capital markets by the 
ratio of the PPG debts contracted  from all private creditors (i.e. bonds plus bank debts) by the 
issuing country relative to the total amount of PPG LDC debts contracted from private creditors. 
The rationale is that the more debts financial institutions hold (relative to all developing debt 
countries debts), the larger is likely to be the amount of information regarding the particular 
borrower. An alternative solution is the use of a dummy variable indicating the presence of a bond 
market. In fact, the presence of tradable debts usually provides an easily accessible price and rating 
of credit. Should the borrower benefit from substantial investors’ knowledge regarding her 
creditworthiness, the lesser would she need to reduce the number of lenders, or compensate the 
main lender for reducing information asymmetries costs. Therefore, y4 is expected to be negative. 
The Variability of income variable is a proxy for the potential asymmetries of information. The 
variable indicates the extent to which private information can be hidden. The higher the variability 
of income the more a borrower is able to hide information on future incomes. The lenders will 
therefore request larger payments for larger funding amounts. The variability of income is therefore 
expected to affect positively the price differential and y5 to be positive. 
3.2. The number of participants in sovereign syndicated loans 
The second model explores the impact of the fees differential on the number of banks joining 
the syndicate. The model of syndicated lenders to be estimated is of the form:   11 
Number of joining lendersi,.j,k  =  Constant + F0 Dummiesj,k 
  + f1 Up-front fees differentiali  (2) 
  + f2 Loan amounti 
  +f3 Number of arrangersi
 
  +f4 Lifetimei
 
  + Errori,j 
where a subscript  i indicates that the variable refers to the  ith loan observation. Similarly 
subscript j and k respectively indicate a variable regarding the jth country and year k. Upper-case 
coefficients indicate vectors. 
The up-front fees differential, the loan amount and the dummies are the same as described 
previously. Model (2) is consistent with the hypothesis that the compensation discrepancy indeed 
has an impact on the number of lenders joining the syndicate. Based on the discussion in Section 2, 
I expect f1 is negative if the premium is intended to reduce renegotiation costs, positive if instead it 
is aimed at reducing borrowing costs. On the contrary, I expect f2 is positive. 
3.3. Endogeneity of the number of lenders to the price differential 
Although the pricing is determined beforehand, the price differential is likely to be determined 
endogenously by the targeted number of lenders. In the third model, the number of joining lenders 
is added in Model (1) as a determinant of the fees differential to form the following model: 
Up-front fees differentiali,j,k =  Constant + Y0
’.Dummiesi.k 
  + y1
’ Number of joining lendersi 
  + y2
’ Liquidityj,k 
  + y3
’
 Solvencyj,k  (1’) 
  + y4
’ Public informationj,k 
  + y5
’ Variability of per capita incomej,k 
  + Errori,j,k 
Simultaneous equation Model (1)-(2’) also helps disentangle the number of lenders from the 
large lender hypotheses. In fact, if the expected renegotiation costs affect the price discrepancy, and   12 
the price discrepancy has a negative impact on the number of lenders, then indeed the premium is 
aimed at reducing the number of lenders. If the second condition is not fulfilled, namely there is no 
impact on the number of lenders, then one should conclude that the premium is distributed for the 
services provided during renegotiation. It also predicts that large lender does behave like a 
relationship lender. This is consistent with e.g. Elsas (2002). 
The model defined by equations (1’)-(2) cannot however be estimated using ordinary least 
squares, for each model includes amongst its explanatory variables the dependent variable of the 
other model. Consequently, the endogenous variables will be correlated with the error terms. As a 
result estimating these models by using the ordinary least squares is inconsistent. Instead, two-stage 
least squares provide consistent estimates of the coefficients and disturbances. For this the model 
needs to be identified, a necessary condition of identification of the equation is that the number of 
exogenous variables excluded from the equation must not be less than the number of endogenous 
variables included in that equation. The identification condition is satisfied in each equation of 
model (1’)-(2). 
3.4. The number of arranging banks 
The study extends to the number of arranging (also “mandated”) banks. Because the arrangers 
generally are large banks, I suspect they may fulfill the alternative roles of large lenders that I am 
investigating. Although mandated banks usually are part of the pool of lenders, they receive a 
separate and always undisclosed payment on top of lending compensations. As a result, the pricing 
analysis would be misleading. Instead, I believe that the number of arranging banks is an 
appropriate proxy and I can yield interesting implications regarding the role they fulfill. 
Indeed, since they are selected by the borrower ex-ante, their large number would translate 
either the attempt to reduce the number of lenders joining the syndicate and/or to obtain pre-
commitments by more banks when loan amounts are large. Also, their relatively larger number may   13 
be helpful when liquidities are scarce.
3 Independently of the roles for large banks that I am 
investigating, arrangers may play a role in reducing asymmetries information and establish 
confidence to other lenders. In fact, their credibility along with their business partnerships 
presumably constitutes an asset for the debtor. 
I therefore look at the impact of information asymmetries, liquidity and solvency risks, as well 
as the size of the loan on the number of arrangers. The model captures all roles possibly assigned 
ex-ante to the arranging banks, i.e. reducing the number of lenders, being/becoming main banks, 
and obtain pre-commitments to increase the probability of fund raising success. Thus, the model of 
the number of arranging banks is: 
Number of arrangersi,j,k  =  Constant + G0 Dummiesi.k 
  + g1 Loan amounti 
  + g2 Liquidityj,k 
  + g3 Solvencyj,k  (3) 
  + g4 Public informationj,k 
  + g5 Variability of incomej,k 
  + Errori,j,k 
where a subscript  i indicates that the variable refers to the  ith loan observation. Similarly 
subscript j and k respectively indicate a variable regarding the jth country and kth year. Upper-case 
coefficients indicate vectors. 
In line with previous hypotheses, I expect that the proxies for public information and 
information asymmetries would have positive and negative impacts on the number of arrangers 
respectively. The sign of g4 is hence expected positive, and g5 negative. If the arrangers provide 
liquidity insurance, the sign of g2 is expected positive. If the arrangers provide pre-commitments in 
the facility and foster the success of the fund raising, the loan amount should have a positive impact 
on the number of arrangers. The sign of g1 is expected positive. 
                                                 
3 As we will see, the mean number of arrangers is of three. In the sample, ninety percent of loans have six arrangers or 
less. The risk of coordination failure is therefore limited.   14 
4  Sampling and data description 
The sample of contracts is assembled from various issues of the International Financing Review 
(IFR) which is the benchmark magazine of loan syndication managers. The sample is composed of 
130 syndicated loans issued or guaranteed by LDC sovereigns between January 1990 and 
December 1997
4 which also report up-front payments. The sample includes all types of loans 
except for Islamic financings,
5 issued by sovereigns located in 28 countries. However, of the 130 
observations, 29 are reported with missing fees at the top or bottom ends making the calculation of 
the difference between the top and bottom fees impossible.
6 Moreover, one observation presented 
some type of security
7 and was deleted. Therefore, the final sample includes 100 observations 
representing 23 countries. Of these 100 observations, 85 report the number of banks joining the 
syndicate that is necessary to estimate Models (2) and (1’)-(2). The report of the exogenous 
variables is complete except for three contracts missing the variability of per capita income in the 
last five years.
8 The descriptive information is presented in Table I and II. 
The average bottom and top fees are respectively of 0.39% and 0.55% making the average 
between top and bottom front-end payments as large as 15.8 basis points. This represents a 
substantial premium of 40.3% relative to the lowest commitment fee. This will cost the borrower a 
maximum amount of 181.9 thousands US dollars for the average 115.1 million US dollars loan. 
Note however that the average up-front fee is substantially lower than in the sample described by 
Hallak (2001) in which the weighted up-front fee was found as high as 0.743% in average on the 
                                                 
4 The statutes were verified in the articles of the company, where it should be stated that the national sovereign agent 
will make sure the company will meet its (foreign) obligations. 
5 Islamic Credit is an equity type of credit that carries no interests. My sample included one Islamic loan only. The 
facility is the second tranche of a credit signed by Turkish Grained Board (TMO) on 18 September 1997 and 
guaranteed by the Republic of Turkey. The first tranche is however a regular term loan and therefore has been left in 
the sample (see International Financing Review No. 1191, 12 July 1997, p. 102-103, for further details). 
6 However, the observation remains suitable for the study if only the lead-manager fee is missing. Each arranger usually 
obtains top management ranking in the syndicate and hardly discloses his own total compensation. 
7 Zambian copper conundrum loan guaranteed by Zambian Ministry of Finance, signed on 17 July 1997. “The principal 
outstanding is at least 150% covered by copper contracts”, in the International Financing Review, No. 1181 May 3 
1997, p.58. 
8 Oman 1996, and Slovenia 1993, 1996. The reason Slovenia has missing variability observations is due to the long 
period lag. Slovenia entered international debt markets relatively early after its independence and did not provide GNP 
figures for the previous five years, yet.   15 
period, January1983 to December 1997. It can be explained by the fact that the sample used by 
Hallak (2001) covers a period of intensive sovereign restructurings until the Brady plans in the 
early 1990s. The respective means of the bottom and top participation fees are however similar to 
the ones described by Esty and Megginson (2003) in their sample of international projects finance 
(36.9-53.1bp). 
The number of lenders per loan is rather heterogeneous too. The mean varies between 6 
(Malaysia) and 70 (Thailand). However, preliminary data screening lets no correlation appear 
between these three parameters of the loan, namely the total number of lenders, the up-front fees 
difference and the size of the loan. 
5  Empirical results 
5.1. The number of lenders and relationship lending 
Tables IV and V summarize the ordinary and two-stage least-squares estimates of the model’s 
structural parameters. The Number of joining bks equations yield several insights. Results show that 
the number of banks joining the syndicate is mainly determined by loan characteristics. The amount 
of debt sought in markets has a strong positive impact at 0.01 level. Similarly to Esty and 
Megginson (2003), the loan lifetime also has a significant negative impact on the number of lenders 
joining the syndicate at standard levels (0.05). However, the impact of the difference between top 
and bottom fees is insignificant at standard levels, t-statistics being equal to 0.13. Surprisingly, the 
Number of arrangers who seek to bring into existence the syndicate has no impact on the Number 
of lenders who commit at the last stage. Last, the price differential has no impact on the number of 
banks joining the syndicate at standard significance levels. 
Conversely, the OLS estimate of the model described by Equation (1) is reported in the third 
column of Table IV. Up-front fees differential is determined by expected factors with expected 
signs. The expected renegotiation, which is proxied by the  Liquidity shortage indicator, has a   16 
significant positive impact on the payment premium at standard levels (5%). This is consistent with 
the hypothesis that the borrower will attempt to reduce the number of lenders as the prospect of 
renegotiation augments in order to increase lenders cohesion and reduce renegotiation costs, e.g. 
Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), Brunner and Krahnen (2001), Morris and Shin (2002). However, the 
amount of information already available to bankers has a positive impact on the differential. 
Probably, this is instead related to financial markets general risk exposure. 
Columns 4 and 5 present the results of the two-stage least squares estimate of the simultaneous 
equation model constituted of the system of equations (1’)-(2). Interestingly, I find similar results 
as in the OLS models except that the number of joining lenders has a significant and positive 
impact on the scale of the price differential among lenders at the 10% level. Therefore, the 
premium augments with the targeted number of joining lenders. 
Therefore, results provide little evidence of price discriminating on syndicated loans being 
aimed at reducing the number of lenders as related e.g. to Morris and Shin (2002) ‘common pool’ 
problem as well as the borrower’s attempt to reduce the renegotiation costs (Preece and Mullineaux 
(1996)). Instead, I find strong evidence that suggests that compensations disbursed to large lenders 
are associated with liquidity shortage risks and asymmetric information. This is consistent with the 
role of l iquidity insurer of the  Hausbank in German credit markets highlighted by Elsas and 
Krahnen (1998). The authors did not find any impact on the interest spreads. The findings provide 
evidence that front-end transfers are associated with a more substantial role during the 
renegotiation. It is in line with Gorton and Kahn (2000) who expect up-front compensations for 
future restructurings. 
5.2. The lending amounts 
The two stage-stage least squares estimates of the simultaneous equation models described by 
(1’)-(2) is presented in columns four and five of Table IV. The number of joining bks equation is 
unchanged with respect to OLS estimate, though. The size of the loan is found to be the strongest   17 
determinant with t-statistics equals 7.03. Again, the payment difference has no significant impact 
(z-statistics equals -0.25). As far as the Up-front fees differential equation is concerned, I find a 
significant positive impact of the targeted number of banks joining the syndicate on the price 
differential at the standard 10% level (z-statistics equals 1.80). Apart from the number of joining 
bks determinant, other factors have the same significance as in OLS estimate of Equation (1) 
presented in the third column of Table IV. Results imply that, all other things being equal, the loans 
syndicated with a larger price differential are associated with more banks providing additional 
funds. 
As a result, the quantity based price discrimination and the loan size seem more likely to be 
suitable candidates to motivate for the presence of a difference in payments among lenders. 
Specifically, the fact that the large lending premium is aimed at increasing the number of lenders 
gives evidence of the latter being aimed at targeting several lending markets. Additional estimates 
are presented in Table V. I add the number of ranks in Equation (1). The results are reported under 
model (7) in Table V. Results show that the larger Up-front fees differential is associated with a 
larger number of ranks in the syndicate at the 5% level (t-statistics equals 2.40). Thus, this provides 
evidence that the difference in the lending compensations reflects the larger costs incurred by the 
larger borrower. The story is that the larger sovereign attempts to widen his set of lending 
relationships for financing capacities purpose. This is consistent with Petersen and Rajan (1994) 
and Machauer and Weber (2000). I find that costs associated with the size of the loan are 
transferred up-front, not on used balance. This may explain why the authors did not find any 
differences in their study based on interest spreads. 
5.3. The number of arranging banks 
I make the estimate of Model (3) of the number of arranging banks to ensure that large lenders 
are not selected before syndication. The arrangers would indeed constitute good candidates also to 
reduce the number of lenders and resolve other mentioned issues. The last column of Table IV   18 
summarizes the results of the Tobit estimates of model (3). Interestingly the number of institutions 
arranging the syndicate is instead negatively determined by default indicators (solvency) at the 0.05 
level. Information asymmetries also significantly increase the number of arrangers at the 0.05 level. 
Loan volumes have no impact at standard significance levels. 
The results are consistent with the hypothesis that the borrower will attempt to reduce 
information asymmetries by ‘hiring’ several trustworthy banks to improve the information 
distribution. However non-reported results show that the number of arrangers has no impact on the 
number of banks joining the syndicate. Therefore, the additional borrowing costs that the issuer is 
willing to pay for, are associated with information asymmetries costs for a given targeted number 
of banks. However, the statistical performance of Model (3) estimate being poor, I believe this 
result should be regarded as a descriptive result. 
6  Sensitivity analysis 
I conduct a sensitivity analysis to make sure of the robustness of the results presented in section 
5. In this purpose, I test alternative independent variables and regression specifications. With regard 
to the independent variables, I replaced the Up-front fees differential with Relative spread, and the 
number of joining lenders with the total  number of lenders. Moreover, to make my results 
comparable with Esty and Megginson (2003) study, I also use the Mean tranche in the syndicate as 
a concentration indicator. Unfortunately, the number of observations providing with a complete 
report of commitments being too low, I was unable to calculate the same concentration ratios.
9 
Results are reported in Table V. 
I find that the Relative spread is sensitive to most of the factors that too determine the Up-front 
fees differential at standard significance levels, namely  liquidity,  Loan size,  Lifetime.  Relative 
                                                 
9 The number of observations with a detailed report of final commitments for each bank in the sample is of 19 only, 
thus being insufficient for a robust statistical analysis of the Herfindhal concentration ratio.   19 
spread is however insignificantly affected by Public information and Variability of income growth. 
The Solvency indicator is again insignificant. 
Interestingly, the mean tranche is related to the same factors as the total number of lenders. 
Only the Number of arrangers has an additional negative impact as compared with the Number of 
joining banks. This is predictable since arrangers usually commit at top levels (highest shares) thus 
reducing the available share to potential joining banks. 
I associate the positive impact of the size of the country’s international debt contracted from 
private creditors relative to the total LDCs international debts contracted from private creditors. 
Indeed other indicators of public information are insignificant at standard levels, namely the 
presence of bond markets for  the particular country as well as GNP size. I also changed the 
liquidity indicator for either the ratio of foreign currencies reserves to the total amounts of short-
term debt and imports or the ratio of reserves to GNP without affecting the significance of the 
estimates. The substitution of the lifetime of the loan by the calculated average lifetime had no 
impact on the results. 
The introduction of the number of ranks in Equation (2), has no impact on other determinants of 
the differential apart from the size of the loan. The number of virtual fee-volume contracts 
proposed to potential lenders has a positive impact on the overall difference between top and 
bottom fee, suggesting that the larger discrepancy is associated with a larger set of contracts. The 
borrower therefore utilizes the price discrimination to tap different markets of syndication. I 
interpret this result as the evidence that the borrower will enlarge the price differential to obtain 
additional providers when the loan is larger. The price differential is thus an additional cost that 
should be associated with the size of the loan, and implicitly with the size of the borrower. This 
result is consistent with Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Weber and Machauer (2000). 
Hence, I can conclude my results  are apparently robust. The main findings relate price 
discrimination on sovereign syndicated credits to the size of the loan and the attempt of the   20 
borrower to increase the number of lenders to obtain a successful syndication. It should be 
interpreted as an additional cost in the attempt to reach various segments of the lending markets as 
the size of the loan increases. 
7  Concluding remarks 
To my knowledge, this paper provides the first comprehensive look at the price differential on 
syndicated loans. The s tudy is conducted in the sovereign debt environment, where legal 
enforcement is poor. More specifically, all other terms of the contract being equal (especially 
seniority), the borrower guarantees higher compensation (in basis points) to institutions providing 
larger amounts. The lending premium is reflected in the front-end payments (the so-called up-front 
fee is a fee paid at the signature of the contract and before any installment of the loan is yet 
disbursed). In particular, I address the issue as to whether price differential affects the number of 
banks participating in the credit facility and relate the positive or negative impact to the gains and 
costs of the number of lending relationships. Also, I relate the premium to the services provided by 
larger lenders in periods of liquidities shortage, e.g. liquidity insurer. Alternatively, the borrower 
attempts to increase the number of market lenders by proposing different sets of contract and larger 
premiums. The motivation is to raise the requested amounts. 
Employing a sample of sovereign syndicated loans between January 1990 and December 1997, 
I find that the price differential is related to liquidity shortage expectations and information 
asymmetries. In the multivariate equation as well as the simultaneous equation model, the large 
lender compensation has no impact on the number of lenders though. Therefore, I find evidence 
that the large lenders obtain compensation not for reducing the number of lenders but instead for 
the implicit services provided in situation of financial distress, especially liquidity insurer. This 
constitutes new evidence that large lenders aim at becoming main banks, and that they obtain 
compensations for associated services.   21 
Also, the size of the loan significantly and positively affects the number of financial institutions 
joining the syndicate. It is a positive determinant of the price differential too. The size of the loan 
thus constitutes a relevant explanation for the price discrepancy. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that lenders have limited financing ability and larger borrowers need to expand the 
number of lenders to raise the requested funds. It is also consistent with the hypothesis that the set 
of lenders expands as the project increases in poor legal environments such as sovereign debt 
markets. 
Interestingly, the investigation is extended to the number of arrangers. The arranging bank(s) is 
(are) the bank(s) that collaborates with the issuer to syndicate the facility. I find evidence 
suggesting that asymmetries of information and the duration of the loan significantly and positively 
affect the number of arrangers. The proxy for expected short-term distress has an insignificant 
impact though. Furthermore, the number of arranging institutions has an insignificant impact on the 
number of banks joining the syndicate. Therefore, I can reject the hypothesis that large lenders 
would be selected ex-ante, and therefore the premium analysis is relevant. However, results have 
underlying implications. Arrangers are likely to serve as reducers of asymmetries of information in 
capital markets. This also provides evidence of the existence of valuable private information in 
sovereign debt markets. Unfortunately, the results are poor and the question definitely deserves 
further investigation. 
Extensions to this paper may hence take several directions. One interesting study is a closer 
look at the influence of the arranging banks. Exploring the impact on syndicated loan features such 
as the lending compensations and their discrepancy, the number of lenders, the loan size, is I 
believe of high relevance. For instance, I suspect that arranging banks with sufficient reputation and 
knowledge on the borrower are able to reduce borrowing costs. Another possible avenue for future 
research is the investigation of the consistency of these results with domestic firms and through a 
cross-country analysis exploring the impact of the legal environment. If it is now becoming clear   22 
that poor creditor rights protection has a positive impact on credit costs and rationing, I suspect that 
remuneration discrepancies will also be affected by legal factors.   23 
Appendix: The syndication procedure and illustration 
The rising of funds through loan syndication is always split into three phases: pre-mandating, post-
mandating, and the signature. 
 
In the pre-mandate phase the borrower identifies the borrowing needs and makes various contacts with 
potential arranging banks. The borrower may demand a competitive bid or select a small number of banks 
through private contacts. This phase is essential for the rest of the syndication and will typically last a few 
weeks. The potential arranger(s) and the borrower must agree on the terms of the bid before any syndication 
is launched. 
 
The post-mandate phase is the syndication phase. At this stage, both the borrower and the pool of 
arrangers have their reputation at risk, the latter being contingent on their ability to raise the requested 
funds. A failure in this phase will probably result in substantial credibility costs. The arrangers then collect 
the lending offers and rank the syndicators accordingly (e.g. lead-manager, manager, co-manager, 
participant). 
 
The final phase is the signature ceremony and the execution of the documentation. 
 
 
Example of syndicated loan  
 
The milestones of the report of the deal displayed here below by the weekly International Financing Review (IFR, 
thereafter) are the following. Rumors of the pre-mandate phase (search for arranging institutions) were disclosed in 
July 1996: “A limited number of banks were asked to submit bids on an individual basis and the borrower will be 
moulding the arranging group, along with consensus pricing” (IFR No. 1143, July 27, 1996). The deal was prepared 
for public syndication and published four weeks later (IFR No. 1147, August 24, 1996). Last, the signature was 
successfully announced five weeks later along with further particulars, especially the participating banks (IFR No. 
1152, September 28, 1996). 
 
General information 
Borrower name  Republic of Borrowland 
Date of signature  23 September 1996 
Type of loan  Term loan 
Purpose of the loan  Finance – General Purpose 
Business of borrower  Sovereign state 
Arrangers  Bank 1, Bank 2, Bank 3, Bank 4, Bank 5. 
Loan information 
Amount  150 Million 
Currency  US Dollar 
Lifetime  7.00 years 
Maturity  23 September 2003 
Basis rate  London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR) 
Spread  50bp, rising to 60bp for years six and seven 
Cash flow information 
Drawdown  Within three months of signing 
Tranches  1 
Repayment information  Five equal semi-annual instalments starting 60 months after signing 
Details of up-front fees 
Lead-management fee  30bp  for  10 million USD 
Management fee  25bp  for  7.5 million USD 
Participation fee  20bp  for  5 million USD 
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Table I 
Price Differential and the Number of Lenders 
by Countries 
For each country, the table reports the number of loans contracted or guaranteed by sovereigns with the 
following information being required: the difference between the lowest and the highest fee paid up-front in 
percentage points (Fees differential) and the loan amount in constant 1995 million US$ (Amount). The total 
number of lending institutions (Number of lenders) and the number of banks joining the syndicate (Number 
of joining banks) are also r eported. The difference between the number of lenders and the number of 
joining banks is the number of arranging institutions that participate in the facility. The sample of 
individual loans stems from the International Financing Review for the period between January 1990 and 
December 1997. The reported values are mean values calculated over the sample period. 
Country  Number of 
reporting: 
 observations  Fees 
differential 
Amount  Number of 
lenders
 
Number of 
joining banks
 
  Fees 
differential 
Number of 
lenders 
       
Algeria  1  0  0.1000  90.72  .  . 
China  5  4  0.2760  198.03  19.25  16.75 
Colombia  2  2  0.1875  261.77  23.50  21.50 
Czech Rep.  2  2  0.0375  140.39  13.50  12.50 
Ghana  2  1  0.1250  58.28  14.00  12.00 
Hungary  5  5  0.1520  46.36  11.00  8.00 
India  12  11  0.1229  88.94  13.73  10.27 
Kazakhstan  1  1  0.1250  47.06  15.00  14.00 
Lithuania  2  2  0.1375  82.30  16.50  7.00 
Malaysia  2  2  0.0000  120.22  6.00  5.00 
Oman  2  2  0.0112  342.22  45.00  36.50 
Philippines  3  2  0.1667  73.40  8.50  7.50 
Pakistan  3  1  0.0417  97.81  28.00  20.00 
Russian Fed.  1  1  0.2000  187.65  29.00  26.00 
South Africa  5  5  0.0850  108.91  15.20  10.60 
Seychelles  1  1  0.3000  27.89  5.00  4.00 
South Korea  4  4  0.2650  101.16  17.25  11.25 
Slovakia  1  1  0.0500  111.75  13.00  8.00 
Slovenia  2  2  0.1250  80.90  10.00  6.50 
Thailand  5  1  0.0790  78.82  70.00  64.00 
Turkey  29  26  0.2045  140.29  20.50  18.19 
Tunisia  3  3  0.0833  122.71  21.67  18.67 
Zimbabwe  7  6  0.1678  48.74  13.50  11.17 
Total  100  85  0.1570  115.61  17.96  14.76
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Table II 
Descriptive Statistics of the Sample 
Highest and lowest fees are respectively the highest and the lowest fee in the syndicate in 
percentage points. Fees differential is the difference between highest and the lowest fees. Number 
of lenders is the number of financial institutions committing to lending for each loan contract after 
syndication. Number of joining lenders is the number of non-arranging banks participating in the 
syndicate. This equals the total number of lenders minus the number of committing arrangers. 
Note that the joint-arrangers are however counted among the ‘joining banks.’ Loan size is the 
credit amount in constant millions of 1995 US dollars. Liquidity is the ratio of foreign currency 
reserves relative to public and publicly guaranteed short-term debt (less than a year maturity). The 
ratio proxies for the sovereign’s ability to repay in the short-run. Solvency is the ratio of long-term 
debt (more than a year maturity) relative to GNP. This proxies for the long-run ability to repay. In 
the sovereign context, this variable provides a proxy for the incentive to repudiate foreign debts. 
Public information is the ratio of the country’s private creditors debt relative to the total less-
developed countries private creditors debt. 
Variable  Num. of Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.
 
Fees differential  100  0.157  0.135 
Highest fee  100  0.550  0.543 
Lowest fee  100  0.390  0.484 
Number of lenders  85  17.96  11.248 
Number of joining lenders  85  14.76  10.681 
Loan amount (million 1995 USD)  100  115.61  119.06 
Liquidity 
Reserves to Short-term Debt 
100  2.211  4.154 
Solvency 
Long-term Debt to GNP 
100  0.260  0.135 
Public Information 
Country’s Bond and Bank Debt to 
all LDCs Bond and Bank Debt 
100  0.031  0.025 
Potential for information 
asymmetries 
Variability of income per capita 
growth in the last five years 
 
97  0.137  0.160 
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Table III 
Definition of variables 
Variable name  Definition 
Endogenous variables   
Fees differential  equals (Feemax – Feemin) where Feemax is the top up-front fee and Feemin is 
the bottom up-front fee. 
Relative spread  equals 
maxmin
min
AMarginAMargin
AMargin
-
 
AMarginmin and AMarginmax being respectively top and bottom ends all-in 
margins. The top (bottom) all-in margin equals the sum of the interest 
spread (annualised interest margin that takes account for pre-designed 
variations over the life of the liability) and the top (bottom) end up-front 
fee calculated as a yearly margin over the lifetime of the loan. 
Number of arrangers  Total number of financial institutions, which are mandated for syndicating 
the loan. 
Number of joining bks  Number of non-arranging banks that participate in the loan syndication. 
Number of lenders  Total  number of financial institutions that participate in the syndicate, 
including all banks joining the syndicate as well as all arrangers holding a 
share of the loan after syndication. 
Mean tranche  equals 
Loan size
Number of lenders
 
the average size of the committed tranche for each loan.   29 
 
 
Table III  
Definition of variables (continued) 
Variable name  Definition 
Exogenous variables   
Liquidity  Ratio of foreign currencies reserves relative to short-term (lifetime under a 
year) foreign currency public and publicly guaranteed debts (PPG). 
Solvency  Ratio of public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) long-term debts relative to 
GNP. 
Public information  Ratio of the country’s total amount of PPG international debts contracted 
from private creditors (banking and bond debts) relative to all LDCs PPG 
long-term debts contracted from private creditors debts. 
Variability of income 
growth 
Five years variability of GNP per capita growth in the issuing economy. 
For country i, year j = 0, 
V(dIncome)i,j = 
( ) 0 ,0
4
2
GNP per Capita growth GNP per capita growth over the last 5 years
5
ij
j
Average
=-
- ￿
 
Loan size  Loan amount in constant billion 1995 US dollars, indexed to US consumer 
prices. 
Lifetime  Time duration of the loan in years. 
Number of ranks  Number of ranks at the syndication phase which are offered to the 
markets. Each rank is associated with a given combination amount – fee. 
India  Dummy=1 if India is country of risk of the issuer, 0 otherwise. 
Turkey  Dummy=1 if Turkey is country of risk of the issuer, 0 otherwise. 
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Table IV 
Models estimates 
All variables are defined in Table III.  The models described by (1), (2) and (3) are estimated 
separately. Models (1) and (2) are estimated using OLS while (3) is estimated using the Tobit 
censured model. The system described by (1’)-(2) is estimated separately using two-stage least 
squares. Country dummies for India and Turkey were included. All variables are defined in Table III. 
Below the coefficient estimates t-statistics are given in brackets for the OLS, z-statistics for the 2SL. 
Number of observations: 100 reporting Fees differential, 85 reporting both Fees differential and the 
number of banks joining the syndicate, 95 both the fees difference and the number of financial 
institutions arranging the loan. In addition, the effective number of observations used for the model 
estimate is reduced because of the absence of three observations on the variability of income growth 
(see Table II). ***, **, * indicate respectively significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels. 
Eq.  (1)    (2)    (1’)  (2)    (3) 
Dependent var.  Fees 
differential 
  Number of 
joining bks 
  Fees 
differential 
Number of 
joining bks 
  Number of 
arrangers 
Fees differential  .    1.066    .  -4.947    . 
  .    [0.13]    .  [-0.25]    . 
Number of  .    .    0.003
*  .    . 
joining bks  .    .    [1.80]  .    . 
Number of  .    0.140    .  0.199    . 
arrangers  .    [0.43]    .  [0.57]    . 
Liquidity  -0.020
**    .    -0.017
**  .    -0.026 
  [-2.45]    .    [-2.10]  .    [-0.10] 
Solvency  0.115    .    0.970  .    -5.375
* 
  [1.18]    .    [1.03]  .    [-1.65] 
Public Info  1.635
***    .    1.170
**  .    -10.019 
  [3.13]    .    [2.38]  .    [-0.59] 
Variability of  0.202
**    .    0.223
***  .    5.447
** 
income growth  [2.44]    .    [3.00]  .    [2.10] 
Loan size  0.190
*    0.562
***    .  0.572
***    -0.106 
  [1.82]    [7.61]    .  [7.03]    [-0.03] 
Lifetime  0.019
***    -0.706
**    0.023
***  -0.619
*    0.032
** 
  [4.57]    [-2.45]    [5.85]  [-1.70]    [2.26] 
Constant  -0.015
    7.870    -0.047  10.251
***    2.010
 
  [-0.30]    [3.89]    [-0.87]  [4.61]    [1.26] 
R-squared  29.1    44.2    31.3  42.6    3.20 
All coeff.=0?  6.14    15.6    41.0  61.3    12.2 
N  97    85    82  82    94 
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Table V 
Further results 
All variables are defined in Table III. Mean tranche, Number of lenders, Relative spread, and Fees 
differential are treated as endogenous. All other regressors are treated as exogenous. Model (4) 
substitutes the  Mean tranche  as the endogenous variable in model (1) and adds economic 
exogenous indicators. Model (5) is the same as model (1), Number of lenders substituting the new 
endogenous variable. (6) is the same as (2), relative spread being the new endogenous variable. 
(7) adds the  Number of ranks as an exogenous variable of model (2).  t-statistics are given in 
brackets below the coefficient estimates. Number of observations: 100 reporting fees differential, 
85 reporting both fees differential and the number of banks joining the syndicate, 95 both the fees 
difference and the number of financial institutions arranging the loan. In addition, the effective 
number of observations used for the model estimate is reduced because of the absence of three 
observations on the variability of income growth (see Table II). ***, **, * indicate respectively 
significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels. 
Eq.  (4)    (5)    (6)    (7)     
Dependent var.  Mean 
tranche 
  Number of 
lenders 
  Relative 
spread 
  Fees 
differential 
   
Fees differential  -2.420    1.895
    .    .     
  [-0.62]    [0.23]    .    .     
Number of  -0.325
**    1.131
***    .    .     
arrangers  [-2.07]    [3.48]    .    .     
Number of  .    .    .    0.034
**     
ranks  .    .    .    [2.40]     
Liquidity  0.186    .    -0.009
**    -0.018
**     
  [0.68]    .    [-1.86]    [-2.17]     
Solvency  -2.944    .    0.094    0.120     
  [-0.89]    .    [1.63]    [1.26]     
Public Info  -6.648    .    0.155    1.364
***     
  [-0.38]    .    [0.51]    [2.61]     
Variability of  0.580    .    0.070    0.196
**     
income growth  [0.22]    .    [1.42]    [2.43]     
Loan size  0.260
***    0.563
***    0.126
**    0.074     
  [8.25]    [7.59]    [2.07]    [0.65]     
Lifetime  0.200    -0.714
**    -0.007
***    0.020
***     
  [1.17]    [-2.47]    [-3.08]    [4.96]     
Constant  4.900
***    9.624
***    0.075
**    -0.101     
  [3.00]    [5.27]    [2.63]    [-1.70]     
R-squared  54.6    49.1    29.0    33.4     
All coeff.=0?  10.7    19.0    6.1    6.37     
N  83    85    97    97     
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